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Abstract
Fictional and non-!ctional texts rely on the same language to express their meaning; yet many 
philosophers in the analytic tradition would say, with reason, that !ctional texts literally make no 
truth claims, or more modestly that the rhetorical and literary devices (e.g., metaphor) to which 
!ction and non-!ction writers alike have recourse are unconnected to truth or have no propositional 
content.  "ese related views are associated with a doctrine in the philosophy of language, most 
notably advanced by the late Donald Davidson, which holds that we understand the semantic 
structure of a language by applying to it a theory of truth, which involves discovering the truth 
conditions of its sentences.  "is approach to semantic theory raises several seemingly intractable 
problems, such as the problem of stating the meaning of non-declarative sentences, e.g. questions 
and imperatives.  "e chief aim of this paper will be to try to dispel these problems by suggesting an 
adjustment in Davidson’s account of the relation of truth to meaning, one which will also allow us 
to picture such troublesome linguistic items as metaphor within a semantic theory, and to expand 
the range of objects which can be brought into a general theory of meaning.
Key words:  Augustine; Donald Davidson; !ctional meaning; hermeneutics; language theory; 
metaphor; semantic theory; truth-theory; truth conditions.
Resumen. Verdad y signi!cado !cticio.
Textos de !cción y no !cción se basan en el mismo lenguaje para expresar su signi!cado, sin embargo, 
muchos !lósofos de la tradición analítica dirían, con razón, que los textos de !cción, literalmente, 
no tienen ninguna pretensión de verdad, o más modestamente, que los recursos retóricos y literarios 
(por ejemplo la metáfora) a los que los escritores de !cción y de no !cción recurren por igual, son 
ajenos a la verdad o no tienen un contenido proposicional. Estos puntos de vista relacionados están 
asociados con una doctrina en la !losofía del lenguaje, especialmente desarrollada por el difunto 
Donald Davidson, que entiende la estructura semántica del lenguaje mediante la aplicación de 
una teoría de la verdad, que consiste en el descubrimiento de las condiciones de verdad de sus 
oraciones. Este enfoque de la teoría semántica plantea varios problemas aparentemente insolubles, 
como el problema de expresar el signi!cado de oraciones no declarativas, por ejemplo, preguntas e 
imperativos. El objetivo principal de este trabajo será el de tratar de disipar estos problemas por lo 
que sugiere un ajuste en la cuenta de Davidson de la relación de la verdad con el signi!cado, esto nos 
permitirá también imaginar esos elementos problemáticos lingüísticos como la metáfora dentro de 
una teoría semántica, y ampliar la gama de objetos que se pueden introducir en una teoría general 
del signi!cado.
Palabras clave: Agustín; Donald Davidson, lo que signi!ca !cción, la hermenéutica, la teoría del 
lenguaje, la metáfora, la teoría semántica, teoría de la verdad, las condiciones de verdad.
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The truth-theory approach to meaning
Donald Davidson’s e!ort to develop a truth-theoretic account of the semantic structure of 
language has been widely recognised, within the analytic tradition, as the leading example 
of this kind of approach to semantic theory.  It was clear to Davidson, however, starting 
with his 1967 paper “Truth and Meaning,” that a truth-theoretic approach to meaning 
faces sizable and far-reaching problems.1  "ese include the problem of providing an 
account of the meaning of non-declarative sentences, and, less of a concern for many 
analytic philosophers, of accounting for #gurative and metaphorical uses of language, and 
of #ctional meaning in general.  "is paper proposes an adjustment of the role that truth 
plays in a truth-based semantic theory, with a view to avoiding the seemingly intractable 
problems which Davidson’s theory has raised, and to widening the range of objects which 
can be brought within such a theory.
7KHLQWLPDWHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQODQJXDJHDQGUHDOLW\VXJJHVWVDQDWWUDFWLYHJHQHUDO
PHWKRGIRUSKLORVRSKHUVZKRUHJDUGWKHWDVNRI H[SOLFDWLQJWKHVHPDQWLFVRI DQDWXUDO
ODQJXDJH DV UHTXLULQJ D GHVFULSWLRQ RI  LWV WUXWK FRQGLWLRQV  ,Q ´7UXWK DQG 0HDQLQJµ
Davidson committed himself  to the view that the only available procedure for providing 
VXFKDGHVFULSWLRQOD\LQD7DUVNLVW\OHGWUXWKWKHRU\ 27KLVSURFHGXUHPLJKWEHDVVLPSOH
DVSODFLQJDQREMHFWVHQWHQFHLQTXRWDWLRQPDUNVDQGWKHQVWDWLQJWKDWWKLVVHQWHQFHZRXOG
DQGRQO\FRXOGEHWUXHUHODWLYHWRVRPHWUXHSHUKDSVJUDPPDWLFDOO\HTXLYDOHQWVHQWHQFH
RXWVLGHTXRWDWLRQPDUNV:HPLJKWIRUH[DPSOHVD\WKDWWKHVHQWHQFH¶6QRZLVZKLWH·LV
true if  and only if  snow is (actually) white.  Such a procedure does not establish a direct, non-
OLQJXLVWLFOLQNEHWZHHQWKHGHFODUDWLYHVHQWHQFH¶6QRZLVZKLWH·SUHVHQWHGZLWKLQTXRWDWLRQ
PDUNVDQGWKHUHDOLW\WRZKLFKDFRUUHVSRQGLQJVHQWHQFHRXWVLGHTXRWDWLRQPDUNVUHIHUV
,QGHHG'DYLGVRQLQHDUO\DQGODWHUZULWLQJVH[SOLFLWO\UHMHFWHGWKHLGHDRI DQRQOLQJXLVWLF
´XQSURFHVVHGµUHODWLRQEHWZHHQUHDOLW\DQGRXUWKRXJKWVRUGHVFULSWLRQVRI UHDOLW\.37KH
intent of  the procedure, more modestly, is to use language to offer a description of  the 
UHOHYDQW IHDWXUHVRI  UHDOLW\ LQRUGHU WREHDEOH WRÀ[ WKHSURSRVLWLRQDO FRQWHQW DQG VR
PHDQLQJRI WKHVHQWHQFHLQTXRWDWLRQPDUNVDQGXOWLPDWHO\ZHUHDV\VWHPDWLFVHPDQWLF
analysis to be achieved, of  the entire natural language to which the sentence belongs. 
:LWKLQ'DYLGVRQ·VSURMHFWVKRZLQJWKHVHPDQWLFSDWWHUQRI DQDWXUDOODQJXDJHZRXOGWKXV
involve specifying the propositional content of  sentences within that language that take a 
truth value.  From the project’s inception, however, even though this is part of  the project 
which never succeeded, Davidson’s intent was to say how a semantic theory can show how 
1 'RQDOG'DYLGVRQ¶7UXWKDQG0HDQLQJ·Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation&ODUHQGRQ3UHVVSS

2 ,ELGS
3 )RU H[DPSOH  ´6HHLQJ 7KURXJK /DQJXDJHµ LQThought and Language, ed. John Preston (Cambridge 
8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVS
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other parts of  language and how sentences which are non-propositional also become part 
of  this general pattern. 
A decisive obstacle facing the truth-theory approach might involve the very ambition 
of establishing a formal semantics or general meaning for a natural language.  !e ambition 
is slightly odd for Davidson to have maintained, given the transient nature of the semantic 
criteria that his theory permitted, for example in his proposal of a passing language or 
a language that two speakers who don’t share the conventions of a common language 
might temporarily construct in order to communicate.  But as Davidson makes clear in 
a late online discussion with Richard Rorty,4 while his ambition might not have been 
as grand as some interpreters have supposed, it did retain this commitment: that some 
semantic pattern must exist for linguistic communication to occur.  In that discussion it 
also becomes clear that he retained his view that, if two speakers are to understand what 
the other is saying, the pattern in question needs to entail a common truth theory, an 
understanding of what it means to assert or deny a range of propositions as extensive as 
their mutual understanding.  
To this extent, Davidson’s account of linguistic understanding is di"cult to resist. 
But it is also limited, in so far as it assumes that a passing language in which speakers 
understand what the other is saying must convey propositional attitudes or claims.  !at 
assumption might seem plausible, since it seems strange to envision a situation in which 
linguistic communication takes place without assertions at least being suggested.  We can 
of course imagine scenarios of lopsided communication, where, for example, the speakers 
have been instructed to con#ne their exchanges to questions and requests.  In these 
situations, it seems natural to assume that assertions are lurking beneath the surface, if 
only because we would expect the recipient of the questions or requests, if she understands 
the language being spoken, to be able to formulate an approximate theory of what was 
being said, simply to show that she understands the questions or requests; and such a 
theory can only be represented through a series of assertions.  But unlike the Tarski-styled 
truth theories which, in Davidson’s view, we need to invoke to explicate sentences that 
have a propositional content, the theory that we expect of the recipient in such a situation 
attaches truth to a description of the speech she understands, not to the speech, let us 
say set apart in quotation marks, which her description is intended to explicate, since 
that speech consists entirely of questions and requests.  Her test of linguistic competence, 
then, involves primarily an application of truth to her interpretation (description) of the 
meaning of an utterance or a text – an utterance which may or may not be asserting a truth 
– and only secondarily, and not in every instance, an application of truth to the utterance 
itself.  
4 ´7KH5RUW\'LVFXVVLRQµ*RRJOHOLQNV
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!is characterisation of her linguistic competence, of her capacity to discern a semantic 
pattern in the utterances she seeks to understand, adjusts Davidson’s semantic theory by 
shifting the application of a truth theory away from meaning per se, whatever purportedly 
is meaningful, to the interpretations which ascribe meaning.  !e adjustment raises several 
issues.  If we follow Davidson’s approach, we can’t speak of meaning without a truth 
theory.  Against this view, the adjustment we have in mind assumes that the relationship 
between (true) interpretations and (propositional) meaning cannot categorically be one of 
equivalence, which Davidson’s use of a Tarski-styled truth formula, at least in paradigmatic 
instances, seems to require.  Another issue concerns the main purpose of an interpretation 
versus the purposes of the text or utterance to which it ascribes meaning.  While 
interpretations are designed to illuminate the meaning of a particular utterance or text 
in relation to a wider semantic pattern, or ‘language’ in Davidson’s sense of the term, the 
intended meaning of a great many utterances and texts is unrelated to this task.  Further, 
there is this di"erence between meaning and interpretation:  While an utterance or text 
might express its meaning in a few words, an interpretation that describes that meaning in 
relation to a language and context is liable to be of encyclopaedic length.
Fiction and indeterminacy:  the problem of metaphorical meaning
We can see a di"erence between interpretation and meaning that goes to the heart of 
Davidson’s commitment to a truth theory when we consider #ctional texts.  Fiction, after 
all, presents an arena of meaning that is fundamentally non-propositional, as #ctional texts 
o"er no explicit truths, only suggestions of truths and a mimetic engagement with reality, 
unless we can #nd a way to collapse the contexts that inform the declarative sentences of 
#ctional contexts into real-world contexts.  Davidson’s discussion of metaphor inadvertently 
points toward this implication.  In his landmark essay “What Metaphors Mean” (1978), 
Davidson concluded that all metaphors are literally meaningless.  His reasons for asserting 
this bold conclusion suggest a tension between his view that a formal semantics reveals a 
semantic pattern that enables communication and his ideas of radical interpretation and 
linguistic indeterminacy.  If ongoing interpretation rather than semantic convention is 
primary in deciding the meaning of sentences, the fact that what metaphorical sentences 
suggest or draw our attention to requires us at some point in our interpretation to reject 
the literal conventional sense of their words would not seem to raise a worry.  !e problem, 
however, as Davidson emphasises, is that “there is no limit” to the content that metaphors 
can suggest.5  When a radical interpreter faces an unusual or unclear use of words in a 
sentence, she can only make sense of them if she assigns them to a larger pattern which 
5 'RQDOG'DYLGVRQ´:KDW0HWDSKRUV0HDQµInquiries into Truth and Interpretation&ODUHQGRQ3UHVV

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!xes their meaning.  On Davidson’s account, non-metaphorical declarative sentences are 
indeterminate only in a limited sense.  "eir meaning depends on a speci!c assignment 
of meaning, provided by an interpretation which places them in some language, which 
makes them true relative to that language.  Without an assignment that !xes the meaning 
of an indeterminate sentence, thus rendering it determinate relative to some language, 
linguistic communication on Davidson’s account is impossible.  By contrast metaphors by 
their very nature resist being !xed in this way, being con!ned to a single interpretation of 
their propositional content, and thus are incapable of communicating any content directly. 
"ey can of course, as Davidson accepts, suggest a great many truths; but they state none 
and so are without propositional content, and therefore on his account without meaning. 
"at conclusion might follow, but only if we reject Davidson’s wider semantic 
commitment to an indeterminist view of what it means to speak a language.  In 
particular we would need to reject the basis of his challenge, issued in “On the Very Idea 
of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974), to the assumption that a language, in so far as it is 
conceived as what grounds actual communication, has !xed semantic boundaries.  What 
Davidson’s worry about the limitless semantic potential of metaphors seems to downplay 
or ignore is his view of the indeterminate nature of the thing which ultimately grounds all 
communication, namely language, conceived not primarily as a set of semantic conventions 
but as a locus of ongoing semantic adjustment through interpretation.  Davidson’s strategy 
in “What Metaphors Mean” is to sever the link between metaphor and truth, and thus 
between metaphor and meaning, by pointing to the fact that metaphors do not state 
truths.  "is strategy relies on the assumption that we have brought into question, namely 
that interpretation and meaning, in paradigm cases of interpretation, are approximately 
equivalent, and that meaning reduces to a !xed propositional content.  Davidson is right 
to say that metaphors suggest many things rather than state speci!c truths, a claim which 
might be taken to mean that our interpretation of a metaphor will be an ongoing a#air 
and not come to an end; but Davidson’s view is that interpretation can make no headway, 
discern no meaning, since it would be di$cult or impossible to raise a consistent language 
to which we might make relative the various contrary truths that we would ascribe to 
the metaphor.  Maintaining a consistent language in Davidson’s solution becomes an 
important ideal.  "e more seriously we take this idea, however, the more we seem to be 
interfering with his view that the idea of a language as a !xed shared structure plays no 
essential role in explaining actual linguistic communication.  
The problem of contradictory interpretations
Metaphors play havoc with any semantic structure, whether conceived as a set of semantic 
conventions or as a temporarily constructed passing language.  But so, too, do such 
unremarkable looking sentences as these:  ‘"e bachelors here are unmarried’ and ‘"e 
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bachelors here are bachelors.’  If we interpret these sentences according to the semantic 
conventions of English, they would seem to be saying the same thing.  But even if we 
preserve the conventions of English, we may have doubts.  If we’re impressed by Quine’s 
famous discussion of synonymy in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” we may doubt whether 
both sentences express tautologies;6 and if we wonder whether ‘bachelor’ draws on the 
same convention each time it occurs in the second sentence, we may take the view that 
neither sentence is a tautology.  Further, it could be that the sentence !ies in the face of 
convention, or that the convention is undecided; considering the latter possibility, we 
may wonder, for instance, whether, according to convention, widowers and divorced men 
should count as bachelors, which might turn into a doubt about whether our existing 
dictionaries capture the convention correctly.  
Should we conclude that the sentence is meaningless until we can stipulate a single and 
exclusive meaning?  Davidson seems to be committed to this constraint when he resists 
the idea of metaphorical meaning on account of our inability to assign a single truth-
theory to a metaphor.  By contrast, he would allow that the sentence ‘"e bachelors here 
are bachelors’ is meaningful, even though it might have inconsistent meanings, provided 
that we specify each meaning.  Using his procedure of stating the propositional content of 
each meaning, we might unfortunately end by having the sentence, on the basis of our best 
evidence of the speaker’s behaviour, represent contradictory truths.  Davidson dealt quite 
neatly with this problem in “"e Inscrutability of Reference” (1979).  His solution there 
was to dispel the assumption that the sentence belongs to “a unique language,”7 and then 
to suggest that we can specify the language in relation to which each interpretation is true. 
Alternative interpretations would thus entail di#erent languages; and a single sentence 
could thereby represent di#erent propositions.  
Normally when we disambiguate in this way, we have in mind a single language which 
happens to contain, as natural languages do and as a passing language might, alternative 
meanings for words.  By referring to di#erent languages in his solution to the problem 
of consistency posed by an inscrutable utterance, as opposed to a language without set 
boundaries, Davidson seems to be concerned to $x categorically the language relative to 
which the sentence considered under alternative interpretations is true.  But that solution 
isn’t coherently available to Davidson.  "e very idea of a constraint which proliferates 
languages begins to resemble the mistake to which he believes we are committed when 
we picture a language as essentially an established system that we share in advance of 
communication.  Perhaps Davidson’s solution could be reinforced by invoking his idea 
of a passing language or non-conventional shared structure, to allow for indeterminacy 
at the level of grammatical appearance – where we face a sentence that does not belong 
6 :924XLQH´7ZR'RJPDVRI(PSLULFLVPµFrom a Logical Point of View+DUYDUGSS
7 'RQDOG'DYLGVRQ ´7KH ,QVFUXWDELOLW\RI5HIHUHQFHµ Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Clarendon 
3UHVVS
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to “a unique language” – and to ensure determinate literal meaning at the level at 
which language actually communicates. 8  But how strenuously should we preserve the 
idea of distinct languages, whether conceived as conventional or passing languages, or 
more realistically as hybrid languages, i.e., heavily conventional languages which are 
continually being adjusted or passing languages which for fairly obvious reasons draw 
heavily on convention?  Conceiving of a passing language as a temporary semantic pattern 
that permits communication to pass between speakers who do not share any linguistic 
conventions at the outset suggests, for practical reasons, a rather limited language, whereas 
the idea of a passing language that changes or develops semantic conventions would seem, 
for contingent reasons, to conform more readily to the semantic patterns that actually 
allow communication to take place.  But either way, there is no need to assume a distinct 
language in the face of an ambiguous sentence that suggests, prior to disambiguation, 
contradictory interpretations.  Unless the intent of Davidson’s solution is that we must 
view passing languages as wholly distinct, there is no need to reject the assumption of a 
unique language, or to accept it; the concern either way seems to be bound to a view of 
language that Davidson explicitly rejects.9
A more economical solution is available.  Instead of having the same sentence, by 
virtue of being ambiguous in respect of propositional content, belong to more than one 
language, we simply observe that using the resources of language we can perform many 
marvellous tasks, including the task of saying di!erent things across varying contexts 
with the same words, or roughly the same things using di!erent words.  When raising 
di!erent contexts, we are not continually speaking di!erent languages but drawing on and 
continually altering language.  
Language and the incompleteness of interpretation
"e limitless proliferation of meaning which Davidson gives as a reason to withhold 
meaning from metaphors should similarly prevent interpretations from assigning meaning 
to a declarative sentence that purportedly bears a truth value.  For there is no way to 
know the limits of what we might have such a sentence mean, unless we can predict 
how innovatively or routinely the language in which it #gures will be spoken.  "e rest 
of the speaker’s linguistic behaviour might over time shed light on what she intended to 
communicate at a particular moment, but unless we invoke the idea of a language with 
de#nite semantic boundaries, we are not in a position to prevent an expansion of the 
sentence’s meaning.  "e sentence might develop a semantic history, to which the speaker 
8 Davidson presents his idea of a passing language and rejects the view of language as essentially 
FRQYHQWLRQDOLQ´$1LFH'HUDQJHPHQWRI(SLWDSKVµZKLFKDSSHDUVLQTruth and Interpretation%ODFNZHOO

9 E.g., in InquiriesS
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and other language users alike may contribute.  Metaphors, in so far as they remain alive, 
encourage such an expansion, but no sentence, regardless of the intent of its speaker, can 
remain safe from an expansion of its meaning if it belongs to an actual language and 
attracts the interest of interpreters over time.  !e only way, seemingly, to "x a sentence 
categorically is to "x the semantic pattern or language in which it has meaning.  But again, 
Davidson cannot accept that solution, short of rejecting his own view of a language.
Davidson is concerned that “much of what we are caused [by metaphors] to notice is 
not propositional in character.”10  Of course what any sentence might cause us to notice 
could be non-propositional.  But the point which Davidson is suggesting is unavoidable: 
Metaphorical meaning, if we allow the  hypothesis that metaphors have meaning, is not 
propositional, at least not directly so; a metaphor might, as Davidson says, suggest many 
truths, but it doesn’t state any.  Even the putatively literal reading of a metaphorical 
sentence, such as ‘Achilles is a lion,’ only has a propositional content if we fail to recognise 
that the sentence is a metaphor, or if the sentence is asserted in a context in which it refers 
to a lion rather than to the "ctional character or "gure of legend named ‘Achilles.’  An 
interpretation which describes the sentence as metaphorical should not end by a#rming 
the view that Achilles might actually be a lion but instead provide a description of the 
relationships that the metaphor suggests.  Since these relationships can continue to expand, 
the interpretation will be incomplete.  But that is hardly surprising.  We expect the meaning 
of metaphors to remain open, and so never to be completely described.
Davidson is right to emphasise that metaphors do not state propositions on another 
count.  At one point in his discussion he o$ers and quickly dismisses the proposal that we 
could provide a propositional content for a metaphorical sentence by taking a truth that 
it suggests to us and imposing it on the sentence.11  By radically adjusting the sense of the 
words of the sentence we might be able to do just that; but then we would not be left with 
a metaphor but a single assertion with a single sense.  For as soon as we give the sentence a 
propositional content, we must also give it the logical form of a proposition, a form which 
implies a single truth value.  
!is requirement points to an important division between propositional language and 
"gurative uses of language, in which we would include not only all metaphors but all "ction. 
Whereas the meaning of a proposition can be expressed by any number of declarative 
sentences – with the only constraint being that the new expression retain the truth value of 
the expression it translates, along with all the logical relations of the translated expression 
to all possible propositions – the meaning of "gurative uses of language tends to be bound 
to the particular words in which it is expressed.  Further, if the "gurative expression occurs 
in a "ctional work, then the task of translating the particular words becomes more exacting, 
10 InquiriesS
11 Ibid.
Ontology Studies 12, 2012   397Truth and Fictional Meaning  
since their meaning is con!ned to a context that depends on the narrative or aesthetic 
structure of that unique work.  In instances where the aesthetic signi!cance of the words 
depends on unique features (their sonic value, letters, a unique etymology, and so on) the 
words may need to be carried into translation unchanged, or the translator may only be 
able to produce an analogous result.  
While the meaning of particular words and sentences in a !ctional work remains largely 
attached to those words, unlike the meaning by which a sentence expresses a proposition, 
the meaning produced by those words, unlike propositional meaning, is indeterminate. 
"is di#erence between !gurative and propositional uses of language points to a division 
in the linguistic indeterminacy thesis, at least if we accept the following characterisation of 
how the thesis applies:  In the case of propositional language, the linguistic appearance of 
a sentence used to express a proposition is indeterminate, but the propositional meaning 
of that sentence is !xed; in the case of !ction, its meaning is indeterminate, i.e. no 
interpretation !xes its (developing) meaning.  
It might seem odd to speak of meaning which is not de!nite.  But this oddness may 
point to another problem with collapsing interpretation into meaning.  In the case of 
metaphor, insisting on a de!nite meaning clearly threatens our logical scruples if we 
collapse interpretation into meaning.  Consider again ‘Achilles is a lion.’  We might take 
that sentence to mean that Achilles is a lion and is not a lion, assuming that we want to 
maintain the tension which the metaphor suggests – if we agree with Davidson that the 
sentence does not reduce to the vague proposition that Achilles is merely like a lion.12  "e 
de!nite claims that we can make about the sentence readily lead to a contradiction, and 
so to an incoherent interpretation.  On at least one reading that outcome seems inevitable. 
But this way of thinking about the relation between interpretation and meaning, in which 
interpretations are thought to assign truth values and thereby to establish meaning, misses 
the temporal and dynamic nature of much non-propositional meaning.  A more plausible 
interpretation would describe Achilles’ apparent transformation into a lion as suggestive of 
a tension, not as a literal con$ation of reference that establishes a contradiction, and would 
retain that suggestion of a tension all the way through an ongoing description of what the 
metaphor begins to draw our attention to.  
"is alternative way of thinking about metaphor is consistent with Davidson’s theory. 
In considering the suggestive capacity of language, though, we need not follow his view 
that metaphors are causal, that they merely cause us to think of various things the way “a 
bump on the head” might.13  In line with Davidson’s general outlook on meaning, it would 
be clearer to say that we interpret the metaphor to be maintaining a mimetic, playful 
relationship between our messy, open-ended, and yet in many ways quite speci!c idea of 
12 IbidS
13 IbidS 
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lions and the messy, open-ended, and yet in many ways quite speci!c qualities embodied 
in the ideal of a man represented by the !ctional or legendary !gure named ‘Achilles.’ 
But whereas our interpretation is a de!nite description, and therefore propositional, the 
meaning which it describes has no propositional content; it draws exclusively from !ctional 
contexts which only mimetically and inde!nitely engage qualities whose references derive 
from a real-world context.
"is distinction turns on our adjustment of Davidson’s semantic theory, by not 
collapsing interpretation into meaning and by rejecting an essential connection between 
meaning and truth relegated to a truth-theory.  Truth is still indispensable in the sense 
implied by the view that an interpretive description of meaning is propositional.  But its 
propositional content is distinct from the content/meaning of what it describes, because 
it relates not only the parts of what we !nd meaningful to a whole, but also relates that 
meaningful whole to a wider, never !nished semantic pattern, a language in Davidson’s 
sense.  Truth plays an essential role in this wider description, but not in the way pictured 
by Davidson’s use of a Tarski-styled truth formula.  Even when a description of meaning 
assigns propositional content to a sentence, the wider description of that sentence’s 
meaning remains an incomplete project, in so far as it picks out the sentence’s relations to 
a language.  "e wider description of a sentence’s meaning is thus not equivalent to the 
propositional content of the sentence, which is always de!nite and complete, regardless of 
whether the sentence used to express this content serves other semantic purposes.  Even in 
the case of a purely analytic sentence, the wider semantic project required to explicate its 
semantic structure would need to include a theory of how a sizable number of signs relate 
to other signs, including various logical and grammatical signs, whereas the sentence itself 
draws on but doesn’t state any of these relations when expressing its propositional content.
In the case of !ctional sentences, the situation resembles the special case of metaphor, 
in that none of the sentences of a !ctional work are propositional.  Instead they represent 
truths through the complex mimetic relations of a !ctional context, and are themselves 
issued through the !ctional device of narrative or character voice.  In some instances, it 
might seem perverse to withhold truth status from a !ctional sentence, when its mimetic 
context draws straightforwardly on real-world references, and when the sentence would 
have a truth value were it to be uttered outside the work of !ction.  If the doctrine seems 
unpalatable in such instances, we might be tempted to hold that the meaning of many 
works of !ction shifts between outer and inner contexts, between real-world contexts and 
those !ctional contexts which mimetically engage real-world references.  But this solution 
assumes that we can assign the meaning of a group of sentences within a !ctional work 
to various real-world contexts without severing its interaction with the !ctional context 
which supplies a di#erent meaning, and so without cutting it o# from all the narrative 
elements (of theme, voice, character, scene, mood, and so forth) conveyed by the sentences 
which draw their meaning from the !ctional context.  "is assumption aside, we gain 
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nothing semantically unique from this division of contexts, as any truth stated inside the 
work, if we can still coherently refer to meaning deriving from a real-world context as 
inside the !ctional work, will be equivalent to its assertion outside the work.  If the concern 
is that some truths might not occur to us without the myriad associations of the !ctional 
work, then we are no longer referring to explicit propositional content.  We have instead 
returned to a worry which we might similarly have over metaphor.  How can a particular 
sentence (or other piece of language, or anything non-propositional) suggest truths which 
it does not literally state?  
Davidson’s causal theory of metaphor
Davidson’s answer to this concern, as we have seen, was that a metaphor’s capacity to 
suggest various truths is wholly causal, and as such as inadvertent and adventitious as the 
relation between the same suggested truths and “a bump on the head.”14  But how can that 
be?  At his rate there would be no distinction to be made between the active critical task of 
interpreting a metaphor, of assigning meaning to it on the basis of its parts in relation to 
their whole within a speci!c context, and in relation to our language, and passively being 
a"ected by it.  Nor would the composition of a metaphor matter.  When delving into the 
semantic associations of ‘Achilles is a lion,’ we would stand no better chance of acquiring 
any of the insights that the metaphor might suggest than were we to turn to a very di"erent 
sentence, for instance ‘Achilles is #ock of geese.’  Instead of a critical task, Davidson sees 
the “elucidation” of metaphor as a causal task.  $e ‘elucidator’ in this idiosyncratic sense 
of the term doesn’t assign a meaning; rather, she provides a “so-called paraphrase” designed 
for a less “sensitive or educated reader,” 15 which is intended to work causally on such a 
reader, to produce the kind of e"ect which the metaphor is liable to have, namely the e"ect 
of stimulating an insight.  $is solution would seem once again to eliminate the distinction 
between interpretation and causal e"ect, but oddly by invoking the idea of another 
insight-stimulator, whose task it would seem brings her precariously close to the activity of 
interpretation.  Indeed Davidson appears to concede “that interpretation and elucidation” 
are “in order” when seeking insight from metaphor, even though he characterises the critic 
as being involved in a rather curious game of stimulus-response, “in benign competition 
with the metaphor maker,” 16 or, presumably, with prospective head-bumpers who similarly 
collapse the distinction between interpretation and causal e"ect and who similarly expect 
by this method to produce insight.  
14 InquiriesS
15 IbidS
16 Ibid.
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!e idea of metaphors imparting a speci"c insight depends on an idea which 
Davidson is right to reject, namely that metaphors have a propositional content, an idea 
which assumes that metaphors have a determinate meaning.  But that idea is curious 
from the start.  Davidson might simply have pointed out that metaphors are inherently 
indeterminate, a point which he does suggest when he says that “there is no limit to what a 
metaphor calls to our attention,”17 and that any sentence which is not given a determinate 
content cannot take a truth value.  !e issue then reverts to the plausibility of the wider 
semantic project, which categorically rejects the idea of semantic indeterminacy, even 
though indeterminacy is assumed as a kind of linguistic veneer over sentences and over an 
entire language (comprised exclusively of propositions?) before apparently indeterminate 
sentences have been delivered to their proper languages by a consistent theory of truth. 
Against this picture, our adjustment permits discovery of insights which a metaphor 
suggests to us while accepting that no metaphor, other than the dead sort, literally states 
or entails these.  Truth, or as Davidson would sometimes say, avoidance of error, is still a 
constraint on interpretation, but only in the sense that an interpretation must be true, as 
opposed to the idea that an interpretation must project truth on to the sentence to which 
it ascribes meaning.  Accordingly it would make sense, depending on context, to reject 
an interpretation of ‘Achilles is a lion’ which asserts that the sentence promotes the view 
that ‘Achilles’ names not one but many creatures of a kind, and that these creatures have 
wings, tend to #ock together, and at times leave the ground in sustained #ight; in short, 
to treat ‘is a lion’ as though it reads ‘is a #ock of geese.’  In the case of sentences issued 
through narration or a character, we can take a similar line, perhaps at times blurring the 
distinction between discovery and interpretive recovery and invention, as seems natural to 
say of indeterminate meaning that unfolds through ongoing interpretation, and view what 
insights we discover as suggested by a semantic structure, a series of semantic relations 
within the entire work, to which we contribute.
The original truth-theoretic semantics and determinate meaning
Semantic determinacy, even in the limited sense advanced by Davidson, is a requirement 
of truth-theory accounts of meaning that drastically reduces, in principle, the permissible 
range of meaningful sentences.  !is reduction extends beyond "ctional and metaphorical 
sentences to the kind of sentences whose prospective meaning inspired the invention of 
the "rst truth-theoretic semantic approach to linguistic meaning.  !e moment occurred 
when Augustine, in his Confessions, faced the problem of trying to decipher the meaning 
of the perplexing and vague opening verse of Genesis – rendered from Hebrew to Latin by 
17 IbidS
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Augustine, and here to English – “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth” 
(King James).  
In his lengthy discussion of this verse Augustine introduced much of the essential 
framework of a truth-theoretic semantics, including the !rst use of the accompanying 
principle of interpretive charity, a version of which would become the basis of Davidson’s 
model of radical interpretation.  But Augustine’s use of charity in that discussion extended 
not merely to the object language and particular sentence which he sought to explicate; 
it extended to all plausible interpretations of the sentence.  While closely examining 
numerous interpretations of Genesis 1:1, Augustine explicitly welcomed contrary 
ascriptions of truth, as provisional interpretations of a sentence whose meaning remains, 
at least for human interpreters, un!xed.  Under a truth-theoretic semantics, however, such 
openness risks incoherence; certainly it does when Augustine characterises many of the 
contrary interpretations he considers as true.18  He would avoid incoherence if it turns out 
that he anticipated Davidson’s solution of making contrary ascriptions of truth to the same 
sentence thereby deliver the sentence into di"erent languages, though given Augustine’s 
practice of extending charity as far as possible toward competing plausible interpretations, 
this solution would involve assigning Genesis 1:1 to a multitude – given the obscurity 
of the verse, a “potential in!nitude” – of languages, which suggests why Davidson was 
loath to regard metaphors as meaningful beyond a recovery of their literal meaning.  Less 
extravagantly, Augustine could have meant that the !rst verse of Genesis suggests many 
truths but that none of these truths circumscribes or is equivalent to its meaning.  #at 
more modest appraisal, however, would have involved giving up the (nascent) project 
of a truth-theoretic semantics, or – not an option for Augustine, nor required with our 
adjustment – consigning the sentence to an expression of nonsense. 
Language and content
Faced with these choices, an interpretation-based semantic theory seems to waver between 
a multiple-language model (to which the need to provide a !xed propositional content 
in at least one instance committed Davidson), regardless of the issue of whether or not 
we should consign metaphor and cryptic sentences to the status of nonsense, and a view 
of meaning which doesn’t assume that a semantic structure must derive from a truth-
theory.  #e model to which Davidson committed himself when o"ering a solution to 
the problem of contrary truth assignments backed him into a corner in which he tacitly 
assumed the idea of distinct languages; otherwise his solution to the problem of contrary 
truths assigned to the same sentence fails.  Davidson, though, as we have seen, rejects the 
18 &RQIHVVLRQV;,,[[Y
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view of languages or worldviews as distinct, or of language as “a clearly de!ned shared 
[conventional] structure”19.  Perhaps his idea of a passing language can come to the rescue 
here, as it o"ers a model of communication which has no recourse to convention.  We 
might, following Davidson’s solution to the problem of contrary interpretations, imagine 
two passing languages to which contrary assignments of truth to the same sentence are 
respectively relative.  A passing language, though, assuming that it doesn’t become inert 
or conventionalised, presumably poses no barriers to meanings or truths which we wish 
to express in it.  If that’s how we conceive of the passing languages to which the truth 
assignments are relative, it would be di#cult to say that the meaning of the sentence that 
we have made equivalent to a truth assignment is determinate, since the two languages 
to which each contrary assignment of truth is relative are not distinct.  When faced with 
the challenge to the indeterminacy thesis based on contrary interpretations, we might 
instead take the view that, while the semantic relations between sentences and a language 
are endlessly variable, a sentence uttered in a certain context can take a truth value and 
a particular interpretation.  If we then vary the truth value and propositional content of 
the sentence, and presumably its context, we will be in a position to consider another 
aspect of its (evolving) meaning; and another if we vary it again, as many aspects as our 
variations impose.  In making these variances, instead of proliferating languages, we are 
taking seriously Davidson’s rejection of the dualism of (linguistic) scheme and content, 
which involves abandoning the idea of language as a structure with distinct and inert 
semantic boundaries, and with it the solution of shifting the same sentence into di"erent 
languages to avoid contradiction.
The insufficiency of truth-theories
Davidson’s solution to the indeterminacy problem only needs to be o"ered if we save the 
assumption of an equivalence between meaning and interpretation.  We might add, in 
cases where an interpretation, conceived as a truth-theory, is not in error.  $is quali!cation 
goes to the heart of Davidson’s e"orts, and in a more modest form can be preserved if we 
give up the view that interpretation of linguistic meaning entails projection of a truth-
theory.   Of course when we describe the semantic structure of a sentence which asserts a 
truth, our description will in e"ect assign a truth-theory.  But doesn’t such an assignment 
assume a description of the words and word-relations of the sentence, and of the context 
which determines how we are using and relating these words in this instance?  A change 
of context, after all, changes the meaning of the words as they form a sentence and so 
what the sentence asserts.  So, a description of the semantic structure of a sentence which 
asserts a truth must include a description of word-order relative to a context.  While that 
19 Truth and InterpretationS
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description naturally is guided in part by what we take the sentence to be asserting, what 
it asserts in turn is determined by the context which informs how we are to understand 
particular words in their relation to the whole sentence, and in relation to an inde!nitely 
large number of other sentences.  A description of meaning, then, does not reduce to a 
description of the sentence’s propositional content. 
"is distinction doesn’t interfere with Davidson’s claim, in “Seeing through Language” 
(1997), that “there is no distinction between having a concept and having thoughts with 
propositional content,” 20 including presumably thoughts concerning a concept someone is 
asking us about – for example, in the question ‘Do you think “Achilles” refers to a #ock of 
geese?’  Understanding a question assumes that we have accurate thoughts about the content 
and context of the question, and presumably that ordinarily we would recognise the mistake 
of anyone who, say, treats the question as though it were a command or a declaration. 
Linguistic understanding, as Davidson stresses in “Seeing through Language,” requires a 
capacity to recognise errors of language use as errors.  In that essay, Davidson makes no 
mention of the requirement of a Tarski-styled truth-theory, and speaks instead of linguistic 
understanding simply as requiring a capacity to recognise an error in interpretation as an 
error.21  In e$ect, he speaks as though he distinguishes between the propositional content 
of the interpretation which represents our understanding of an utterance and the (perhaps 
non-propositional) content or meaning of the utterance.  He doesn’t acknowledge this 
distinction, but none of the requirements of linguistic understanding which he speci!es 
in this late essay would be undermined were it to be maintained.  What would be gained? 
For one thing, we would be able to talk, without further explanation, of understanding 
non-propositional meaning, while preserving the constraint of truth.  We would be able to 
talk of the meaningfulness of questions and imperatives, and of being correct or mistaken 
about their meaning, without further adjustments to our semantic theory.  Likewise, we 
would be entitled to refer to !ctional or mimetic meaning.  "e only truth constraint 
which we will have eliminated is the one that rests on the dogma that tacitly eliminates a 
distinction between interpretation and meaning.
Non-linguistic meaning 
Once we eliminate this dogma, there is no obvious reason why we cannot extend a theory 
of meaning to non-linguistic items, for example, visual artworks and musical performances. 
Provided that our interpretations of the artwork or music can describe discernible 
relationships between the entire work and its parts, and we can specify contexts in which 
our interpretation could be in error (for example, when we mistakenly take sporadic 
20 Thought and LanguageHG-RKQ3UHVWRQ&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV, p. 
21 Ibid.
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coughing to be integrally rather than incidentally connected to a musical performance), 
then we can intelligibly speak, as we tend commonly to do, of these objects as meaningful, 
in a sense that accords with a general theory of meaning.  Like questions, imperatives, and 
the sentences of !ction (and for that matter declarative sentences which assert truths), 
an artwork or piece of music says nothing by itself, outside a context in which recovery 
of meaning is possible.  Beyond the minimal condition of context, all these semantic 
objects require, not a truth-theory but a theory or interpretation which happens to be true 
(relative to our language as it applies within a speci!c context which we can specify more 
or less exactly), to recover or elaborate their content.  In the case of declarative sentences 
which state a truth, the theory is itself true and it describes the sentences as having the 
form of a speci!c statement, and so in e"ect, among other things, projects a theory of truth. 
In the case of questions and imperatives which refer to real-world concepts, the theory is 
true but it doesn’t project truth on to the question or imperative to which its description 
assigns meaning.  With mimetic objects, we might be tempted to say that the possibility of 
error recedes and with it the prospects for an attribution of meaning.  But less dramatically 
we can say that the contexts of recovery are more frequently varied and sometimes more 
di#cult to specify, and conclude from these hermeneutic facts the banal point that some 
interpretive tasks remain conspicuously incomplete and so present an ongoing challenge. 
Such (unsettled) works provide an exemplary instance of the fact that interpretations are 
provisional in at least these two respects:  a shift in context requires a shift in interpretation; 
and failure to specify all aspects of a (complex) context leaves an interpretation incomplete. 
But these are considerations of a practical nature; they don’t in principle rule out the 
possibility of meaning for sentences and objects whose presumed meaning is not explicit 
and whose interpretive context is not relatively straightforward.  
Ineffable meaning versus explicit meaning
$e adjustment to Davidson’s (full-blown) semantic project which this paper o"ers keeps 
in tact his view that truth, or avoidance of error, plays an essential role in our recovery or 
elaboration22 of meaning.  Michael Morris raises an important challenge to this view in 
his Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (Oxford, 2007).  Following a criticism of 
Davidson suggested to him by Paul Davies, a colleague at Sussex University, Morris invokes 
the open-ended signi!cance of works of art – the fact that no interpretation ever fully 
captures the signi!cance of those “pieces of music, works of literature, paintings, and so on” 
22 7KLV GLVWLQFWLRQ LV ZRUWKPDLQWDLQLQJ DV WKH VSHDNHU DXWKRU RU FUHDWRU RI VRPHWKLQJPHDQLQJIXO
SUHVXPDEO\ FDQQRW DQWLFLSDWH HYHU\ IXWXUH FRQWH[W LQZKLFK KHU XWWHUDQFH RU FUHDWLRQ KDVPHDQLQJ
QRUDQWLFLSDWHDOOWKHVXUSULVLQJUHODWLRQVZKLFKPLJKWRFFXULQFRQWH[WVZKLFKVKHGRHVKDYHLQPLQG
)XUWKHUZHFDQSUHVXPDEO\SURYLGHFRQWH[WVLQZKLFKZHFDQVSHDNRIWKHPHDQLQJRIWKLQJVWKDWDUH
not man-made.
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to which we !nd ourselves returning “again and again” – to question the assumption that 
the situation is di"erent in the case of “ordinary linguistic meaning,” which might similarly 
elude our ability to capture it through an “explicit statement” or series of statements.23 
After raising Davies’ concern, Morris points out that “[n]o argument is provided for 
[the aforementioned] assumption, and in general it’s not questioned within the analytic 
tradition.”24  Davies’ criticism and Morris’ suggested application of it beyond Davidson’s 
theory of language raise an important challenge to semantic theories within the analytic 
tradition, and to the present adjustment to Davidson’s theory.  While their concern concurs 
with the view advanced by this paper, and it seems by most non-philosophers, that we can 
speak reasonably of the meaningfulness of works of art, including non-linguistic works 
of art, they doubt whether an explicit description of meaning is a necessary condition of 
meaning.  
I would agree entirely with this point of their concern.  Clearly, we only rarely explicitly 
interpret the meaning of texts or objects which we regard as imparting signi!cance of 
some kind, and perhaps we never do so completely.  Nor is it likely that, if pressed, many 
of us would ever rise to the challenge of explicitly describing very far the meaning of 
even relatively simple meaningful objects, for instance, straightforwardly true declarative 
sentences.  For that matter, it remains an open question whether anyone, in a tradition 
based on the development of linguistic analysis for over a hundred years and substantially 
dedicated to the task of analysis within the limited arena of declarative sentences which 
bear a truth value, typically considered within unproblematic contexts, has provided an 
adequate general theory to account for the meaning of these, let alone of the stream of words 
and sentences which comprise the less containable but perhaps no less representative parts 
of linguistic communication.  My response to this elaborate concern brings my agreement 
with Davidson to a head.  It is this:  that if any of our encounters with meaning are not 
illusory, they must in principle, irrespective of normal, unexamined practice, represent a 
series of semantic relations and a context which could be made explicit, even if in fact they 
never completely will be.  If this response is right, then there remains, after we give up the 
general semantic requirement of a truth-theory, an essential connection between meaning 
and truth, even in the case of !ctional meaning.
23 Michael Morris, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language2[IRUGS
24 Ibid.
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